UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1996/1038
12 December 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UGANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the members of the Security Council, a communiqué dated 9 December 1996 from the Government of the Republic of Uganda concerning allegations by Zaire against Uganda. I would be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Matia M. SEMAKULA KIWANUKA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-36267 (E) 131296

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Annex

Communiqué

The Government of the Republic of Uganda wishes to refer to document S/1996/994 dated 2 December 1996, which was forwarded to the Security Council by the Permanent Mission of Zaire to the United Nations on 2 December 1996.

The Government of the Republic of Uganda categorically refutes the baseless allegations by Zaire and wishes to bring to the attention of the Security Council the following.

Contrary to Zaire's allegations that the Government of Uganda had affirmed that Ugandan troops would remain in Zaire territory, the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) at no time crossed the border and entered into Zairian territory. Instead, on 13 November 1996, Uganda was invaded by forces originating from inside Zaire territory. Those forces occupied Ugandan towns of Bwera, Karambi and Mpondwe for four days. During their occupation, they looted property and killed many innocent Ugandans. UPDF responded and repulsed the invading forces which were given hot pursuit forcing them to retreat into Zaire territory.

On 19 November 1996, the Ugandan border town of Mpondwe was shelled by forces from the Zairian border town of Kasindi. During the shelling some armed groups from inside Zaire attempted to re-enter Uganda's territory. UPDF again responded by destroying positions that the invading forces were using for launching their attacks against Uganda territory. Furthermore, Uganda categorically rejects Zaire's claims that UPDF participated in the fighting in the Zaire town of Beni and other towns inside eastern Zaire.

It is important to note in this regard that the conflict in eastern Zaire is a result of a number of events.

After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the defeated Rwandan soldiers and the Interahamwe camped along the Zaire-Rwanda border (two miles inside Zairian territory) with all the military hardware they carried from Rwanda.

Pursuant to the resolutions passed by the summit meetings at Cairo and Tunis on the Great Lakes region on 28 and 29 November 1996 and 16 to 18 March 1996, respectively, attended by the following countries: Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire and Uganda, President Mobutu undertook to disarm these groups and to move them away from the common border to places acceptable under international law and United Nations conventions. For two years, Zaire continued harbouring armed elements who regularly made cross-border attacks against Rwanda, causing perpetual threat to international peace and security in the region.

In 1981, the Zairian Parliament enacted a law that disenfranchised part of its citizens (Banyamulenge), who have been living in Zaire for over 200 years. This law resulted in discord among the Banyamulenge. The situation was aggravated by the decision taken by the Governor of Kivu Province to expel the Banyamulenge from Zaire.

The internal Zairian dissident groups took advantage of the fluid situation in eastern Zaire and took up arms. Another factor arising out of the fluid situation in Zaire is how that country has become a base for dissident groups bent on destabilizing their neighbours.

An example of that is the time Ugandan dissidents have been living in Zaire, with the full knowledge of the Zairian authorities. These have taken advantage of the prevailing situation and attacked Uganda from Zairian territory. UPDF assumed its constitutional responsibility of defending Uganda and flushed the enemy out of Ugandan territory. Zaire should muster the courage and acknowledge the fact that the problem within eastern Zaire is a result of its own oppressive policies against a section of its citizenry.

Uganda remains committed to working closely with other countries in the region and the rest of the international community to seek peaceful solution to the problems in the region. It is in that regard that Uganda offered to headquarter the multinational force established by the Security Council in its resolution 1080 (1996) of 15 November 1996 to create favourable and safe conditions to facilitate the delivery of international humanitarian assistance to those in need in eastern Zaire.

Let it be understood, however, that Uganda reserves the right to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity in the event of any form of external aggression, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

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Security Council

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S/1996/1039
12 December 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH, FRENCH
AND RUSSIAN

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its relevant resolutions and the statements of its President,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 5 December 1996 (S/1996/1010),

Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Tajikistan and to the inviolability of its borders,

Expressing its grave concern at the continuing deterioration of the situation in Tajikistan, and stressing the urgent need for the Government of Tajikistan and the leadership of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) to adhere sincerely to the commitments they have made to resolve the conflict and to achieve national reconciliation exclusively through peaceful, political means on the basis of mutual concessions and compromises,

Expressing also its grave concern at the ongoing fighting in Tajikistan and repeated violations of the Tehran ceasefire agreement of 17 September 1994 (S/1994/1102, annex I) and about the failure of both parties to implement the Ashgabat agreements (S/1996/754, annex I),

Emphasizing that the primary responsibility rests with the Tajik parties themselves in resolving the differences, and that the international support provided by this resolution must be linked to the process of national reconciliation and the promotion of democracy,

Expressing its satisfaction at the regular contacts between the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) and the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Russian border forces and the Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Tajikistan,

Commending the efforts of UNMOT under difficult circumstances,

1. Expresses its appreciation for the report of the Secretary-General of 5 December 1996;

2. Condemns the ongoing flagrant violations of the ceasefire by the parties, in particular the recent opposition offensive in the Garm region, and demands the immediate cessation of all hostilities and acts of violence;

3. Calls upon the parties to comply fully with the Tehran Agreement and all the other obligations they have assumed, and strongly urges them to extend the ceasefire for the whole duration of the inter-Tajik talks;

4. Condemns also the terrorist acts and other acts of violence which have resulted in the loss of life of civilians as well as members of the CIS Peacekeeping Forces and the Russian border forces;

5. Decides to extend the mandate of UNMOT until 15 March 1997 subject to the proviso that the Tehran Agreement remains in force and the parties demonstrate their commitment to an effective ceasefire, to national reconciliation and to the promotion of democracy, and further decides that this mandate will remain in effect until that date unless the Secretary-General reports to the Council that these conditions have not been met;

6. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 15 January 1997 on the parties' compliance with the Tehran Agreement and the results of meetings between the President of the Republic of Tajikistan and the leader of the UTO, and requests him also to provide recommendations in that report on the nature and size of the United Nations presence in Tajikistan in this light;

7. Calls upon the parties to cooperate fully with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in resuming the inter-Tajik talks in order to achieve a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict, with the assistance of the countries and regional organizations acting as observers at the inter-Tajik talks, and, in this context, welcomes the meeting between the President of the Republic of Tajikistan and the leader of the UTO on 10-11 December 1996, and encourages them to continue this dialogue;

8. Welcomes the efforts of the Joint Commission in defusing tensions between government and opposition forces on the ground;

9. Strongly condemns the gross mistreatment of members of UNMOT by both parties, including threats against their lives, and urgently calls upon the parties to ensure the safety of the personnel of the United Nations and other international organizations, to cooperate fully with UNMOT, and to lift all restrictions on the freedom of movement of its personnel;

10. Urges the Tajik parties to cooperate fully with the International Committee of the Red Cross to facilitate the exchange of prisoners and detainees between the two sides;

11. Expresses its serious concern at the indiscriminate use of landmines in Tajikistan and the threat which it poses to the population and UNMOT personnel, and welcomes the proposals of the Secretary-General in his report of 5 December 1996 in this regard;

12. Expresses its deep concern over the worsening of the humanitarian situation in Tajikistan, and calls upon Member States and others concerned to respond promptly and generously to the consolidated inter-agency donor alert on urgent humanitarian needs for the period from 1 December 1996 to 31 May 1997 launched by the Secretary-General;

13. Encourages States to contribute to the voluntary fund established by the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 968 (1994);

14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

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A/51/728
S/1996/1040
13 December 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 43
THE SITUATION IN BURUNDI

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Identical letters dated 12 December 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter from the Burundian Government which summarizes the positions of opposition to the economic blockade against Burundi that have been adopted and officially recorded in the declarations issued by His Holiness Pope John-Paul II on 25 September 1996, by the World Food Summit, held from 13 to 17 November 1996 in Rome, by the summit meeting of heads of State and Government of the countries members of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, held in Brazzaville on 2 and 3 December 1996, and by the nineteenth summit meeting of the Heads of State of France and Africa, held in Ouagadougou from 4 to 6 December 1996.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nsanze TERENCE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-36338 (E) 131296 131296

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ANNEX

Identical letters dated 10 December 1996 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Burundi addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to inform you that the summit meeting of heads of State and Government of the countries members of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, held at Brazzaville on 2 and 3 December 1996, considered, inter alia, the situation in the Great Lakes region and, in particular, the situation in Burundi.

At the conclusion of the summit meeting, the heads of State and Government adopted the following position on Burundi:

"[We] note the efforts being made by Burundi and Rwanda to receive and reintegrate refugees in conditions of security and dignity, and encourage those countries to continue such efforts.

"[We] note the measures already taken by the Government of Burundi to restore the democratic process in that country, and take note of its commitment to expedite the creation of democratic institutions within a reasonable time-frame by giving priority to dialogue with the political class as a whole and all segments of Burundian society.

"[We] invite the States parties to the Arusha Accords to lift the embargo, which has a greater effect on the Burundian people, especially the most vulnerable social classes.

"[We] encourage therefore all parties in Burundi to choose a form of mediation which guarantees objectivity and neutrality in order to move ahead in the peace process, in the interests of the people of Burundi.

"The officers of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa will support such measures."

The nineteenth summit meeting of the heads of State of France and African countries, held at Ouagadougou from 4 to 6 December 1996, after reaffirming its support for the utilization of subregional structures for enhancing crisis-prevention and coordination under the auspices of the United Nations, shared the views expressed by the inter-agency meeting at Brazzaville with regard to the situation in Burundi:

"The heads of State, Government and delegation have taken note of the Declaration of the summit meeting of the heads of State and Government of the countries members of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, held on 2 and 3 December 1996 in Brazzaville, the Congo."

In addition, the Rome Declaration on Global Food Security, issued at the conclusion of the World Food Summit, held in Rome from 13 to 17 November 1996, affirms the following with regard to the blockade imposed against Burundi:

"Food should not be used as an instrument for political and economic pressure. We reaffirm the importance of international cooperation and solidarity as well as the necessity of refraining from unilateral measures, not in accordance with the international law and the Charter of the United Nations and that endanger food security."

Similarly, His Holiness Pope John-Paul II, noting how the suffering of Burundians had been increased by the sanctions, said in a General Audience at the Vatican on 25 September 1996 "... I hope that those sanctions, which weigh most heavily on the civilian population, will be lifted." Further to that appeal, the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations sounded this warning on 20 November 1996: "If Burundi continues to be isolated and its people condemned to live in conditions of extreme need, it is possible that extremists of all sorts will seize the opportunity to plunge the country into chaos."

The Government of Burundi is pleased to note that the Pope and the heads of State and Government have grasped the full significance of the tragic and unbearable situation caused by the illegal, unjust and immoral blockade imposed on the Burundian people since July 1996 by the Arusha Summit; may they feel themselves involved and draw the appropriate practical conclusions.

Burundi has consistently maintained that the blockade is not an instrument of peace. Rather, it is an impediment to the efforts aimed at bringing relief and assistance to those who have suffered from three years of war, to protect and organize people of all ethnic groups from lethal violence, to restore peace and revitalize the democratic process through a dialogue and debate whose outlines have already been drawn, and to restore justice, chiefly by bringing to justice those responsible for the murder of President Ndadaye and acts of genocide against the Tutsi minority (see S/1996/682 and S/1996/910).

Furthermore, Burundi has consistently requested the international community - certain of whose members among Burundi's neighbours are manipulating Burundian refugees at the expense of ethnic integration and are providing a base for terrorist organizations - to support the efforts of Burundians, while acknowledging the responsibility of the latter and meeting their true expectations.

Accordingly, the Government of Burundi calls upon the competent organs of the United Nations, in the light of the foregoing, to take, as a matter of urgency, all necessary steps to implement the resolutions on Burundi produced by the summit meeting of heads of State and Government of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43.

(Signed) Luc RUKINGAMA
Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Cooperation

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1996/1041
16 December 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 12 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 11 December 1996 addressed to you by Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, concerning statements made by former Turkish officials confirming that there has been a conspiracy ever since 1991 to partition Iraq and separate its northern region and that the imposition of the no-flight zone in northern Iraq in 1991 was part of the process of implementing this scheme.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-36548 (E) 161296 161296 171296

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Annex

Letter dated 11 December 1996 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

I should like to communicate to you reported statements made by Mr. Kenan Evren, a former President of Turkey, to the Turkish newspaper Cumhuriyet on 9 November 1996 concerning "the oil of the Iraqi Vilayet of Mosul" and a plan for "the occupation of a part of Iraqi territory in the north". This is clear from the following text:

> "Question: You mentioned Mosul's oil, so I should like to ask a question on that. Turgut Özal's idea was 'put down one and take five'. Would it have been correct and preferable if we had entered Iraq at that time?
>
> "Answer: Özal explained the idea to me, and I said to him 'You will become embroiled that way, because if you were to get involved in a matter with the Arabs you would never be able to extricate yourself, particularly since the United Nations resolution refers to the need for regard for Iraq's territorial integrity. So this idea cannot be accepted by any other country. Cyprus is a small matter, but it is still not over. So how would it be if we went into Iraq?'"

These statements confirm what we have been saying all along, namely that in 1991 and subsequently there was a conspiracy to partition Iraq and to separate the north and that the unilateral decision of the United States and French Governments at that time to impose a no-flight zone in northern Iraq was part of the process of implementing this scheme. It will be obvious to you that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom are still insisting on maintaining this zone and are pursuing the self-same policy that is linked with the scheme in question.

You will agree with me that attempts to threaten Iraq's sovereignty, territorial integrity and stability such as those indicated above are totally incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant Security Council resolutions and that they undermine security and stability in the region. This requires that the international community should take heed of such attempts and should oppose them.

(Signed) Tariq AZIZ
Deputy Prime Minister and
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/1996/1042
16 December 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE RETURN OF KUWAITI PROPERTY SEIZED BY IRAQ

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to report on steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq. A list of the property returned since the issuance of my report of 2 March 1994 (S/1994/243) is contained in the summary annexed to the present document.

2. The Government of Kuwait continues to stress the importance it attaches to the return of archives belonging to the Offices of the Amir, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the Foreign Ministry. It has also drawn attention to the fact that private properties have not been returned, nor have items of military property including 8 Mirage F1s, 200 BMB2 carriers, 6 M84 tanks, 90 M113 carriers, one Hawk missile battery, 483 strila 3 missile batteries, 206 Osa missile batteries, and 5 Amon anti-aircraft missile batteries. These items have been brought to the attention of representatives of the Government of Iraq on a number of occasions.

3. Mr. Raymond Sommereyns, Director of the West Asia Division of the Department of Political Affairs, continues to serve as my Coordinator for the return of property. In that capacity, he will remain available to receive, register and submit to Iraq claims presented by Kuwait and to facilitate the return of any property which Iraq may declare to be in its possession. The original hand-over documents for all returned items are available for inspection in the Department of Political Affairs.

Annex

Summary of Hand-over operations for the period from 2 March 1994 to 15 October 1996

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

HAND-OVER DOCUMENT		ITEMS DESCRIPTION	HAND-OVER LOCATION
NUMBER	DATE		
01001	22-04-95	18 APC M-113	UM QASR, IRAQ
01002	23-04-95	15 APC M-113	"
01003	24-04-95	12 APC M-113	"
01004	24-04-95	12 APC M-113 COMMANDER	"
01005	25-04-95	JEEP M151 AND OTHER CARS	"
01006	25-04-95	12 APC M-113 COMMANDER	"
01007	26-04-95	VARIOUS TRUCKS	"
01008	26-04-95	VARIOUS CARS	"
01009	26-04-95	20 APC M-113	"
01010	26-04-95	VARIOUS CARS	"
01011	26-04-95	VARIOUS CARS	"
01012	29-04-95	120 DIFFERENT KIND OF GUNS	"
01013	29-04-95	12 APC M-113	"
01014	29-04-95	STRELLA 2 MISSILE QTY (149)	"
01015	30-04-95	VARIOUS CARS	"
01016	30-04-95	20 APC M-113	"
01017	01-05-95	6 APC M-113 AND 12 APC FAHD	"
01018	01-05-95	VARIOUS CARS	"
01019	02-05-95	25 APC FAHD	"
01020	02-05-95	GUN MORTAR QTY (42)	"
01021	03-05-95	TRAILERS AND HEAD TRUCKS	"
01022	06-05-95	APC M-113 AND TRUCKS	"
01023	14-05-95	VARIOUS VANS AND CRANES	"
01024	15-05-95	VARIOUS CARS	"
01025	15-05-95	BATTERY AND BATTERY CHARGERS AND OTHER ITEMS	"
01026	22-05-95	37 JEEP M151 AND 20 TOYOTA BUSES	"
01027	21-05-95	M548 AMMUNITION CARRIERS(3), F/3 FRENCH GUN 155 QTY (5)	"
01028	22-05-95	5 APC M-113	"
01029	22-05-95	8 LOW BED (70T) TRAILERS ONE HIGH BED (10T) TRAILER	"
01030	22-05-95	6 JEEP M151 AND NISSAN P/UP	"
01031	23-05-95	AMBULANCES QTY 43 AND DIFFERENT TYPES OF CARS	"
01032	24-05-95	APC SALAHDIN TRAINER AND 26 APC SALAHDIN	"
01033	27-05-95	O-O-SA RUSSIAN MOBILE FIRE CONTROL UNIT QTY 2	"
01034	29-05-95	15 LOW BED TRAILERS (70T) AND A LOW BED TRAILER (15T)	"
01035	29-05-95	3 VICKERS TANKS, 3 APC FAHD AND OTHER EQUIPMENT	"
01036	04-06-95	26 LOW BED TRAILERS AND 6 TIRES WITH RIMS 24X20.5	"
01037	26-06-95	13 SCOUT CAR FERRET AND A GMC P/UP TRUCK	"
01038	27-06-95	CRANE WINCH TOYO (20T), 22 BUS NISSAN AND OTHER EQUIPMENT	"
01039	28-06-95	4 CRANE WINCH (20T) AND OTHER EQUIPMENT	"
01041	08-06-95	TOYOTA P/UP	"

COFFEE POT BELONGING TO SHEIKH ABDULLAH AL-MUBARAK AL-SABAH

HAND-OVER DOCUMENT		ITEMS DESCRIPTION	HAND-OVER LOCATION
NUMBER	DATE		
01040	28-06-95	COFFEE POT	UM QASR, IRAQ

NAVY

HAND-OVER DOCUMENT		ITEMS DESCRIPTION	HAND-OVER LOCATION
NUMBER	DATE		
01042	08-07-95	VARIOUS NAVY EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS	UM QASR, IRAQ
01043	11-07-95	TWO LANDING CRAFTS, ONE TUG BOAT	BUOY 5, PERSIAN GULF

INSTITUTE FOR ARABIC MANUSCRIPTS

HAND-OVER DOCUMENT		ITEMS DESCRIPTION	HAND-OVER LOCATION
NUMBER	DATE		
01044	21-10-95	LIBRARY, MANUSCRIPTS' MICROFICHE AND PHOTOGRAPHY EQUIPMENT	UM QASR, IRAQ

MINISTRY OF HEALTH

HAND-OVER DOCUMENT		ITEMS DESCRIPTION	HAND-OVER LOCATION
NUMBER	DATE		
01045	22-10-95	20 METER SURVEY LAUNCH BOAT, MIJRIM	BUOY 5,PERSIAN GULF

ARABIC CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH

HAND-OVER DOCUMENT		ITEMS DESCRIPTION	HAND-OVER LOCATION
NUMBER	DATE		
01046	26-3-96	OFFICE FURNITURE	UM QASR, IRAQ

AMIR'S BELONGINGS

HAND-OVER DOCUMENT		ITEMS DESCRIPTION	HAND-OVER LOCATION
NUMBER	DATE		
01047	15-10-96	FIVE SWORDS, TWO RUGS, THREE GILDED VESSELS, A GOLDEN PATEK PHLIPE POCKET WATCH WITH KNIFE AND CHAIN, A SHIELD AND A WOODEN PANEL WITH A METAL PIECE.	UM QASR, IRAQ

FREE ART STUDIO

HAND-OVER DOCUMENT		ITEMS DESCRIPTION	HAND-OVER LOCATION
NUMBER	DATE		
01700	16-04-94	66 OIL PAINTINGS AND CARVINGS	SAFWAN, IRAQ

UNITED ARAB MARITIME COMPANY

HAND-OVER DOCUMENT		ITEMS DESCRIPTION	HAND-OVER LOCATION
NUMBER	DATE		
01900	26-03-94	FILES AND SUPPLIES	SAFWAN, IRAQ

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HAND-OVER DOCUMENT		ITEMS DESCRIPTION	HAND-OVER LOCATION
NUMBER	DATE		
01901	15-08-94	36 BEEPERS UNIT, BEEPER TRANSMITTER AND WOODEN PANEL	SAFWAN, IRAQ

C-130

HAND-OVER DOCUMENT		ITEMS DESCRIPTION	HAND-OVER LOCATION
NUMBER	DATE		
02000	07-02-95	MAIN LANDING GEAR AND OTHER EQUIPMENT	AL-SUWAIRA AIR
02001	08-02-95	LANDING GEAR CONT. ASSEMBLY AND OTHER EQUIPMENT	BASE, IRAQ
02002	11-02-95	RESERVOIR AND OTHER EQUIPMENT	
02003	12-02-95	EXTERNAL FUEL TANK AND OTHER EQUIPMENT	
02004	13-02-95	PROP DOMES AND OTHER EQUIPMENT	
02005	14-02-95	PROP ASSEMBLIES AND OTHER EQUIPMENT	
02006	18-02-95	T-56 #1 AND #4 ENGINES	
02007	19-02-95	WEATHER RADAR AND OTHER EQUIPMENT	
02008	22-02-95	EXTERNAL FUEL PANEL, MLG TIRES AND FUEL SURGE SUPPRESSOR	AL-SUWAIRA AIR
02009	27-02-95	MAIN AND NOSE SHOCK STRUTS AND HORIZONTAL STABILIZER	BASE, IRAQ
02010	28-02-95	ENGINES ASSEMBLIES AND OTHER EQUIPMENT	
02011	07-02-95	MAINTENANCE PUBLICATIONS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT	
02012	11-03-95	AFT CARGO FLAP AND PALLET (SCRAP METAL)	
02013	12-03-95	MOTOR FLAP AND OTHER EQUIPMENT	
02014	14-03-95	SCRAP PALLET	
02015	19-03-95	NOSE, TAIL SECTIONS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT	

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

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S/1996/1043
13 December 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 10
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON
THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Identical letters dated 10 December 1996 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council

I wish to refer to the High-level Consultation on Post-conflict Peace-building in West Africa: Political and Development Initiatives, held in New York on 21 October 1996 under my auspices, with the participation of representatives of the 16 members of the Economic Community of West African States as well as of 21 donor countries and five multilateral institutions. The Consultation was co-chaired by the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. It considered strategies for formulating and funding, in the specific West African context, programmes aimed at consolidating peace and promoting development in post-conflict situations.

The focused and consensual atmosphere of the Consultation allowed for an in-depth, action-oriented consideration of the issues under review. The purpose of the present letter is to bring to the attention of the members of the General Assembly and the Security Council, in advance of the detailed summary of the Consultation being prepared by UNDP, some of the findings, ideas and proposals discussed by the participants. It should be read in the context of the statement by the President of the Security Council of 22 February 1995 (S/PRST/1995/9), in which the Council urged States "to support the efforts of the United Nations system with regard to preventive and post-conflict peace-building activities and, in this context, to provide necessary assistance for the economic and social development of countries, especially those which have suffered or are suffering from conflicts".

96-36377 (E) 131296

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A first finding was that, in West Africa, peace-building is indeed relevant to all phases of a conflict and should therefore not be limited to post-conflict situations only. Reference was made repeatedly to those "half-war half-peace situations", as a participant called them, where a country may experience a high level of insecurity and instability but not continuous, full-fledged hostilities. The point was made throughout the Consultation that the foundation on which peace is built must be laid before a conflict ends and that development should be an integral part of that foundation.

A second finding was that West African countries affected by war or in special situations need not only humanitarian relief but also assistance that will address as a matter of priority the security and political dimensions of development. Included in that assistance should be programmes aimed at disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, demining, strengthening of civil society, confidence-building, enhancement of public security, reconciliation, strengthening of public institutions etc. In some cases, especially in the wake of a peacekeeping operation, the peace-building activities conducted by the United Nations system should be placed temporarily under the overall coordination of a special representative of the Secretary-General, with a mandate to focus those activities on the restoration and consolidation of peace and security.

Several obstacles to assistance of the type described above were identified. One was the current definition of official development assistance, which excludes programmes aimed primarily at the restoration of a safe and secure environment. Another related obstacle was the reluctance of donor countries to allocate development funds to countries characterized by a high level of insecurity. This reluctance led to situations such as those in Mali and Sierra Leone, where substantial development funds had been committed by the donor community but their delivery had been conditioned by some donors on the signing of a formal peace accord. The result was that urgently needed assistance that could have contributed to an early restoration of security and stability in those countries was unnecessarily delayed.

Two proposals were made to overcome these obstacles: (a) to include programmes aimed primarily at the restoration of a safe and secure environment in the official definition of development assistance; and (b) to establish a peace fund to finance programmes that promote the security needed for development and humanitarian relief. I have asked the Co-Chairmen of the Consultation to examine and report to me on the possible design and terms of reference of such a funding mechanism.

A third finding of the Consultation was that the proliferation of small arms poses a threat to the security and development of West Africa as a whole and not only individual countries. The two missions which I sent to Mali and to the Sahara-Sahel countries in 1994 and 1995, respectively, under the leadership of former Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity William Eteki-Mboumoua, have emphasized both the importance of micro-disarmament as a peace-building tool and the destabilizing effects of cross-border flows of small arms. Every effort should therefore be made by donor countries not only to include disarmament programmes in their development assistance but also to

stem the uncontrolled export of small arms to regions that do not manufacture them.

A fourth finding was that peace and disarmament efforts are at their most effective when a Government shows the political will to address the root causes of conflict, when friendly neighbours offer impartial mediation, and when donor countries and the United Nations provide the necessary assistance. This finding was based on an extensive discussion of Mali's recent history, led and informed by two Ministers from that country who described their Government's determination to involve all segments of the population in the peace process, to recognize the specific development needs of the north, to reintegrate former combatants into civil society, to help resettle refugees and to provide a secure environment conducive to disarmament.

Beyond the case of Mali, there is increasing and welcome evidence that the forces of peace are overcoming those of war in West Africa. In Sierra Leone, in Liberia and in other countries, West Africans are showing their strong commitment to peace, reconciliation and development and deserve the full support of the international community and the United Nations system. In that connection, reference was made by some of the participants to the difficulty of defining the respective responsibilities of the Security Council and the General Assembly in post-conflict peace-building and of apportioning the funding of the related activities between assessed and voluntary contributions. It was suggested that the Council and the Assembly might want to consider ways of clarifying their respective responsibilities in that field so that the United Nations system can provide more readily and more effectively the special type of assistance needed by countries threatened by, or emerging from, armed conflict.

In the belief that this High-level Consultation on Post-conflict Peace-building in West Africa was a useful initiative, I shall consider organizing similar consultations on other regions whose specific development and security conditions could benefit from this kind of attention of the international community.

I should be grateful if you could bring this information to the attention of the members of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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General Assembly
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13 December 1996

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda items 33, 35 and 85
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES
AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF
THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND OTHER
ARABS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Identical letters dated 13 December 1996 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have been instructed to bring the following to your immediate attention. This week the Israeli authorities approved a plan of construction of 132 housing units for Jewish settlers in the heart of occupied East Jerusalem on an area of land measuring 14 1/2 dunums. If implemented, the settler colony would be within the original and recognized municipal border of East Jerusalem and it would be in the middle of the crowded Arab neighbourhood of Ras al-Amud, which is inhabited by 11,000 Palestinians. It would also be overlooking Al-Haram Al-Sharif and Al-Aqsa Mosque.

The Israeli plan for the settlement violates the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, article 49 of which prohibits the occupying Power from transferring its civilian populations into the occupied territory. Many Security Council resolutions have affirmed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to all the occupied territory, including Jerusalem. Further, the Israeli plan violates specific Security Council resolutions related to Jerusalem, including resolutions 250 (1968), 252 (1968), 267 (1969), 271 (1969), 298 (1971), 446 (1979), 476 (1980), 478 (1980) and 672 (1990). In those resolutions the Council, inter alia, declared that all of the measures and arrangements taken by Israel, including the legislative and administrative ones, aimed at changing the legal status of the city are null and void and without any legal validity. In

those resolutions the Council also called upon Israel to desist from changing the character of the city and its demographic composition.

The General Assembly only recently, on 4 December 1996, reaffirmed once again a clear position in this regard in its adoption of the resolution on Jerusalem (resolution 51/27) by an overwhelming majority, which was adopted as part of a series of General Assembly resolutions critical of Israel's policies and behaviour. Today the General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted a resolution on the Israeli settlements (resolution 51/133), reaffirming that Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, are illegal and demanding complete cessation of all settlement activities.

The Israeli plan in Ras al-Amud also represents a gross violation of the Declaration of Principles signed by the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization on 13 September 1993, in which the parties agreed to negotiate, among other things, the status of Jerusalem as part of the negotiations on the final settlement, which should have already commenced in May of this year. Needless to say, this obliges the parties not to create new facts on the ground which would pre-empt the expected negotiations and render them useless. In addition, it is certain that such a new settler colony would generate practical and dangerous ramifications. The prevailing situation created by the illegal settler colony in Hebron is a clear example in this regard.

The Israeli Government obviously has not ceased attempting to further change the situation in Jerusalem and create a new demographic composition in the city. A case of such was raised in our letter to Your Excellency of 27 August 1996 (A/51/310-S/1996/699) regarding the Israeli destruction of the building belonging to the Burj al-Laqlaq Society within the walled Old City of Jerusalem. Another case was the opening by the Israeli authorities of a tunnel in the vicinity of Al-Haram Al-Sharif and their refusal to comply with Security Council resolution 1073 (1996) in this regard. Also, the Israeli Government has repeatedly imposed illegal measures aimed at depriving Palestinian Jerusalemites of their inherent right to live, like their ancestors did, in their city. The Israeli authorities have been considering Palestinian Jerusalemites as "foreigners" and applying all kinds of illegal tricks and manoeuvres to take away the so-called "residence rights" from them, including, for instance, attempts to do so to those who have American citizenship.

Sources also indicate that the current Israeli Government plans to build two more settler colonies within occupied East Jerusalem, in Wadi al-Joz and Jabal al-Mukabir, in addition to the plan for building another settler colony in Jabal Abu-Guneihm. All of the above-mentioned come as part of the intensification of settlement building by the Israeli Government in pursuit of its campaign of settler colonialism in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem.

The Israeli Government, then, is following an illegal and dangerous path. Its plan in Ras al-Amud is tampering with the sensitive and precarious issue of Jerusalem. It is completely illegal under international law and the relevant Security Council resolutions. It threatens to shatter the Middle East peace process and thus threaten international peace and security.

The Security Council has the responsibility to act on behalf of the international community to prevent such developments, to protect the peace process and to guarantee respect for the Council's resolutions and for international law. Accordingly, we request that the Council formally consider the matter and urgently take the necessary measures in this regard.

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as an official document of the fifty-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 33, 35 and 85, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nasser AL-KIDWA
Permanent Observer of Palestine
to the United Nations

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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S/1996/1045
16 December 1996

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CENTRAL AMERICA: EFFORTS TOWARDS PEACE

Report of the Secretary-General

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council pursuant to the request of the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), which is contained in the Framework Agreement on the Resumption of the Negotiating Process (A/49/61-S/1994/53, annex) and in all subsequent agreements, for the United Nations to carry out international verification of the peace accords which they have been negotiating with the assistance of the United Nations. The report is concerned exclusively with the agreement on the definitive ceasefire, which was signed by the parties on 4 December 1996 in Oslo and follows upon my report of 26 November 1996 to the General Assembly, which was also circulated to the Security Council (A/51/695-S/1996/998). In that report I indicated (para. 12) that verification of measures related to the ceasefire agreement would be required very soon after signature of the overall package of peace accords and would, inter alia, involve the deployment of United Nations military personnel to verify the ceasefire, the separation of forces and the demobilization of URNG combatants.

2. The agreement on the definitive ceasefire will come into force, like other agreements in the overall peace package, upon the signing of the final peace agreement, which is scheduled for 29 December 1996 in Guatemala City. Subject to the Council's approval, the agreement will then require, within a short time, an increase in the United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA), through the addition, for a period of three months, of a military component to undertake verification of its implementation.

3. The purpose of the present report is to convey to the Security Council my recommendations on how the proposed military component of MINUGUA should undertake the responsibilities entrusted to it by the ceasefire agreement and on what changes will as a result be required in its organization and strength. These recommendations are based on the findings of a technical survey team of

the Secretariat which has visited Guatemala to assess requirements and to prepare for the possible deployment of United Nations military personnel.

II. VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS ARISING FROM THE AGREEMENT ON THE DEFINITIVE CEASEFIRE

A. Ceasefire

4. The agreement provides that the ceasefire will enter into force as of 0000 hours on D-day, the date on which the United Nations verification mechanism shall be in place with a full operational capacity, and that the process must be completed no later than D+60, with the demobilization of approximately 3,000 URNG combatants. From D-10 to D-day, the United Nations is asked to deploy its personnel and equipment in order to verify the ceasefire at the sites agreed by the parties. During the ceasefire, MINUGUA military observers will be present in designated military units of the Guatemalan armed forces (GAF) and at URNG assembly points for purposes of verification. Any alleged violation of the ceasefire is to be investigated, verified and reported by MINUGUA military observers.

B. Separation of forces

5. A separation of forces is to be carried out in several stages, with certain Guatemalan army units redeploying to specified locations and URNG assembling at various sites before moving to designated assembly points. The parties are to communicate to MINUGUA military observers, no later than D-10, the full programme for the moves of their respective forces, including composition, routes to be taken and any other information needed to complete the verification. Redeployment of the units of the Guatemalan armed forces is to begin on D+2 and to continue until D+10 or earlier. URNG troops will begin to move from D+11 to D+21, but only if the Guatemalan armed forces have completed their movement. Each URNG group moving to the assembly points will be escorted by United Nations military officers.

6. URNG combatants are to be concentrated at eight assembly points. They will move to these points after D-day only along designated transit routes. After D-day, assembled combatants will be prohibited from leaving the assembly points without the consent and verification of United Nations personnel. United Nations military observers will provide unarmed escort to URNG combatants when they need to leave the assembly points for purposes specified in the agreement.

7. From D-day until URNG has completed its movement to the assembly points, United Nations military observers will establish 8 team sites of 15 personnel each in order to verify the ceasefire. Another 32 personnel will be positioned at the 8 team sites for command and control purposes.

8. The redeployment of GAF units will result in the establishment of areas in which the armed forces are not present. The minimum distance between GAF units and URNG assembly points will be 6 kilometres. A security zone with a radius of 6 kilometres will thus be established around each assembly point and the only military personnel permitted access to these zones will be those of the United Nations. Any police activities inside these zones will be subject to

coordination with the United Nations verification authorities. A coordination zone with a radius of a further 6 kilometres will be established around each security zone. Movement in the coordination zones by units of the Guatemalan armed forces or volunteer civil defence committees (CVDCs) must be coordinated in advance with United Nations military personnel.

C. Disarming of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca

9. The registration and storage of weapons in the URNG assembly points will be controlled and verified by the permanent presence of United Nations military observers, prior to the complete demobilization of URNG combatants. URNG is to provide the United Nations with detailed information on the number of its combatants, inventories of weapons, explosives and mines and of all other military equipment, both in its possession and in storage. Disarming will consist of the depositing, registration and handing over to the United Nations of all types of offensive and defensive weapons, explosives and munitions by URNG combatants. From D+11 to D+42, URNG will deposit its military equipment and weapons in special warehouses designated by the United Nations; combatants will, however, keep their personal equipment and weapons as long as they remain at assembly points. Each warehouse will have two locks, with one key held by a United Nations officer and the other by the URNG official in charge of each assembly point. URNG weapons will be transferred to the appropriate Guatemalan authorities by the United Nations after the completion of demobilization. URNG combatants will hand over their personal weapons and uniforms before being issued a demobilization certificate and leaving the assembly point.

D. Demobilization

10. The agreement provides that the demobilization of combatants of URNG, which will put an end to its military structure, will be carried out in the following phases: from D+43 to D+48: 33 per cent; from D+49 to D+54: 66 per cent; from D+55 to D+60: 100 per cent.

E. Concept of operations

11. If the Security Council agrees that MINUGUA's strength should be increased to permit it to fulfil the additional verification functions described above, it will be necessary to establish a military component in the Mission. This new component would be under the overall control of the Head of the Mission. It would be commanded by an officer at the rank of Brigadier General, who would be appointed by the Secretary-General after consultations with the parties and with the consent of the Security Council. The personnel of the military component would be contributed by Member States at the request of the Secretary-General after consultation with the parties and with the Security Council's approval. The military component would require a strength of 155 officers and some medical personnel until the verification process described above is completed. The members of the military component would have to arrive in the Mission area no later than D-15.

12. Between that day and D-day, the main headquarters of the military component would be established for command, control and logistic purposes in Guatemala City. There would be sector headquarters in Guatemala City and Santa Cruz de Quiché. As noted above, MINUGUA military observers would deploy to 8 verification team sites in the immediate vicinity of the established URNG assembly points. These team sites would ensure a permanent United Nations presence at the URNG assembly points and at designated bases of the Guatemalan armed forces. The teams would execute their verification tasks by patrolling the security and coordination zones by ground and air. They would liaise with the headquarters of the Guatemalan armed forces, its regional commands and URNG at the designated locations and assembly points. For the purpose of coordination, a joint working group would be established with the participation of representatives of both parties to the agreement.

13. If this process is to succeed, the assembly points will have to be fully prepared to receive URNG combatants. A mechanism coordinated by the United Nations has accordingly been established to oversee their preparation. The European Union (EU), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), along with several Member States and the Government of Guatemala, are contributing to this undertaking.

14. There would also be additional requirements for premises/accommodation, transport and air operations, communications and miscellaneous equipment. In addition to MINUGUA's existing helicopter, two others with all-weather capability would be required. I shall submit, as soon as possible, an addendum to the present report with preliminary cost estimates for the addition of a military component to MINUGUA for the three-month period envisaged.

III. OBSERVATIONS

15. The agreement on the definitive ceasefire was the third agreement in the Guatemalan peace process to be signed this year. Its signing had been preceded by that of the agreement on social and economic issues and the agrarian situation, at Mexico City on 6 May 1996 (A/50/956, annex), and that of the agreement on the strengthening of civilian power and on the role of the armed forces in a democratic society, also at Mexico City, on 19 September 1996 (A/51/410-S/1996/853, annex). Since its signature on 4 December 1996, two other agreements have been signed: the agreement on constitutional reforms and the electoral regime, on 7 December 1996 at Stockholm; and the agreement on the basis for the integration of URNG into the political life of the country, on 12 December 1996 at Madrid. The agreement on the timetable for the implementation and monitoring of the peace agreements will provide that the staggered demobilization of the URNG forces must be started at the same time as the implementation of the undertakings set out in the peace agreements as a whole.

16. Both parties thus want to see the military aspects of the peace settlement implemented as soon as possible after the signature of the final peace agreement, which is scheduled to take place at Guatemala City on 29 December 1996. This creates a need for the United Nations to deploy MINUGUA's new military component very rapidly after that date. I am therefore

presenting the present report to the Security Council in advance of the signature of the final peace agreement. The only agreement in the overall package which remains to be negotiated is the timetable for the implementation and verification of the peace accords. I am confident that the negotiation of that agreement will be rapidly concluded and that it will be signed, as scheduled, at the same time as the final agreement on a firm and lasting peace.

17. The General Assembly has so far assumed the central role in promoting and supporting the peace process in Guatemala, including especially its decision to establish MINUGUA and subsequently to extend that Mission's mandate on a number of occasions. Verification of the definitive ceasefire will, however, require the deployment of United Nations military observers, as described in the present report. In accordance with the established practice of the United Nations, such deployment will require authorization by the Security Council, which has consistently supported the peace process in Central America since it first commended the efforts of the Contadora countries in resolution 530 (1983). The Security Council may wish to grant me contingent authority to take the necessary steps to ensure that the United Nations will be able to attach a military component to MINUGUA, with the mandate, strength and structure proposed in the present report, as soon as possible after the final peace agreement has been signed. Authorization for the actual deployment of the component would be sought as soon as it is confirmed that the final peace agreement has been signed.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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16 December 1996

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LETTER DATED 16 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey to you the attached letter, dated 13 December 1996, which I received today from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, Ambassador Robert R. Fowler, pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1080 (1996) of 15 November 1996.

I should be grateful if you would bring the text of the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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Annex

Letter dated 13 December 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I am writing to you further to my letter of 14 November 1996 (S/1996/941, annex) in which the Government of Canada undertook to work with other Governments to enable the deployment of a temporary multinational force for humanitarian purposes in eastern Zaire. As you know, this mandate was subsequently established by the Security Council in its resolution 1080 (1996).

Pursuant to the mandate and the force level agreed to by the Steering Group, which was established to give political direction to the multinational force, the Commander of the force, Lieutenant-General Maurice Baril, established the headquarters of the force in Kampala. He conducted extensive discussions throughout the region to determine how the multinational force should fulfil its mandate.

After consulting with our partners in the Steering Group, Canada has now concluded that, with the return to Rwanda of the majority of refugees, the dispersal of the remaining number over large areas of eastern Zaire and the growing access of international humanitarian agencies to the remaining refugees, displaced persons and civilians at risk, the multinational force at the current authorized force level has very little utility.

Canada will therefore withdraw its command and Canadian elements of the multinational force by 31 December 1996. In the intervening period, and as long as the force remains in place, it will continue to provide assistance to humanitarian organizations.

Canada recommends that the Security Council terminate the mandate of the multinational force, effective 31 December 1996.

I should be grateful if, further to Security Council resolution 1080 (1996) and our recent report of 5 December (S/1996/1013, enclosure), you would inform the Council of our decision.

(Signed) Robert R. FOWLER
Ambassador
Permanent Representative